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Abstract Although the traditional ‘‘lie detector’’ test is
used frequently in forensic contexts, it has (like most test of
deception) some limitations. The concealed knowledge test
(CKT) focuses on participants’ recognition of privileged
knowledge rather than lying per-se and has been studied
extensivelyusingavarietyofmeasures.A‘‘guilty’’suspect’s
interaction with and memory of crimescene items may vary.
Furthermore, memory for crimescene items may diminish
over time. The interaction of encoding quality and test delay
on CKT efﬁciency has been previously implied, but not yet
demonstrated.Weusedaresponse-timebasedCKTtodetect
concealed knowledge from shallow and deep study proce-
dures after 10-min, 24-h, and 1-week delays. Results show
that more elaborately encoded information afforded higher
detection accuracy than poorly encoded items. Although
classiﬁcation accuracy following deep study was unaffected
by delay, detection of poorly elaborated information was
initially high, but compromised after 1 week. Thus, choos-
ing optimal test items requires considering both test delay
and initial encoding level.
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Introduction
Despite the popularity of traditional ‘‘lie detector’’ tests and
numerous reports of their success (for a review, see Honts
et al. 2005), several limitations have been identiﬁed (e.g.,
Lykken 1998; National Research Council 2003; Raskin
1989). One promising alternative is to measure concealed
knowledge. Instead of relying on suspects feeling aroused
or anxious when deceptively answering crime-related
questions (e.g., ‘‘Did you shoot the drugstore guard on June
23rd?’’), the concealed knowledge test (CKT) (Lykken
1959) indexes an examinee’s recognition of crime-relevant
information. The typical CKT
1 paradigm presents a critical
probe stimulus alone with several irrelevant items. For
example, ‘‘The person who stole the statue would recall its
appearance. Was it made of (a) gold, (b) silver, (c) wood,
(d) glass, or (e) plastic?’’ Participants are asked to respond
‘‘No’’ after each answer choice is presented. During this
process, one or more physiological measures are recorded,
and differential responsivity to probe choices compared to
irrelevant alternatives indicates knowledge of the crime.
The CKT has been successfully coupled with a variety of
physiological measures such as heart-rate, electrodermal
response (EDR) (for review see Ben-Shakhar and Elaad
2003), brain electrical activity (e.g., Rosenfeld et al. 1988),
and pupil dilation (e.g., Lubow and Fein 1996). More
recently, it has also been successful with behavioral mea-
sures such as response time and accuracy (e.g., Allen et al.
1992; Seymour and Kerlin 2008; Seymour et al. 2000).
Time and Encoding Effects on the CKT
Despite its success in the laboratory, surprisingly few
studies have investigated the time course of the concealed
knowledge effect. This is particularly important because in
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information and the subsequent test may be quite variable,
ranging from minutes to years. In previous studies, the
effect of time on CKT efﬁciency can vary from one
dependent measure to another. For example, one study
used an EDR-based CKT and examined detection accuracy
for tests immediately following a mock-crime as well as
those delayed by 1 week (Carmel et al. 2003). These
results revealed no effect of delay for either EDR magni-
tude or detection accuracy. Elaad (1997) also reported
successful EDR-based tests after 1 week. Using an event-
related brain potential (ERP) based CKT, Rosenfeld et al.
(1991) examined tests that either immediately followed
probe study or were separated by 7–14 days. They reported
high accuracy on immediate tests similar to previous
reports (e.g., Farwell and Donchin 1991; Rosenfeld et al.
1988), but not in delayed conditions. Accurate detection in
delayed conditions required re-exposing participants to
critical items immediately prior to test.
The success of both immediate and delayed tests may
also be inﬂuenced by the level of attention allocated to
each stimulus at initial exposure, and the resulting quality
of memory for these items. Information present at the
crime scene but never encoded will be unfamiliar and
decrease the accuracy of a CKT using such information.
Indeed, most CKT procedures explicitly correlate lack of
response to test items with lack of prior exposure. For
example, Carmel et al. (2003) reported that when partici-
pants were alerted to which mock-crime details were
important, later EDR-based CKT accuracy was higher than
when noticing probe items was left to chance. Regardless
of whether they were made explicit, using probes that were
more central to a crime (e.g., the weapon) led to higher
detection accuracy than more peripheral items (e.g., veneer
of a table). Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine
whether the decrease in accuracy reported by Carmel and
colleagues for un-cued crime items was due to participants’
poor encoding of the items or their failure to encode them
altogether. This is an important distinction because it may
be possible to detect poorly encoded information, but not
unencoded information.
A more straightforward approach to answering this is to
have participants explicitly study probe items and then
manipulate their degree of encoding. Thus, CKT accuracy
could be evaluated for well-encoded or poorly encoded
probes while minimizing the likelihood that they are
completely unencoded. For example, a recent study com-
pared ERP-based CKTs in which the only probe item was
either the participant’s name (highly elaborated in partici-
pants’ memory) or the experimenter’s name (newly
learned) and showed greater classiﬁcation accuracy for the
more elaborated stimulus (Rosenfeld et al. 2006). Although
this paradigm successfully varies levels of probe encoding,
the use of a single probe item with such a special status as
one’s own name makes it an effective, but somewhat
extreme demonstration. A variation on the Rosenfeld et al.
(2006) paradigm would be to explicitly expose participants
to either a set of probe items that they encode richly or ones
that they encode poorly, but avoiding the special status of
one’s name. Previous studies have demonstrated that the
amount of attention paid to a particular crime item is
positively correlated with both the level of physiological
response to that item during a lie test, as well as to the
item’s later explicit recall by the participant. In these
studies, level of attention was not manipulated, but inferred
by the level of physiological response to each stimulus
during study (e.g., Waid et al. 1978, 1981a). This corre-
lation between attention and detectability appears to predict
that using peripheral items in the CKT will lead to poorer
detection efﬁciency than more central items. However,
though Waid et al. (1981a, b) were able to ﬁnd this rela-
tionship using the traditional ‘‘lie-detector’’ test, they did
not ﬁnd that attention and EDR were strongly correlated in
the CKT.
Related non-applied work has also examined the rela-
tionship between the manner in which material is processed
and the likelihood that it will be later recalled. Craik and
Lockhart’s (1972) Levels of Processing (LOP) approach
typically contrasts shallow (e.g., focusing only on the
superﬁcial visual characteristics of a word) and deep pro-
cessing (e.g., focusing on the category membership or
meaning of a word) of stimuli. Although various encoding
types may lead to some long-term storage, the probability
of later recall was higher for more deeply processed
stimuli. As Baddeley (1999) points out, deep processing
may also refer to the richness or breadth of encoding, so
that focusing on multiple aspects of an item (e.g., visual,
auditory, and semantic) may enhance its later recall com-
pared to focusing on only one aspect. Thus, crime-scene
information leading to more elaborated memories (viz.,
items used to commit the crime, or highly salient aspects
such as the victim’s face) should be more successful probe
items than less salient details (e.g., ﬂowers growing at the
crime scene; Nakayama 2002).
Do Time and Encoding Interact in the CKT?
Although by some accounts six or more speciﬁc and central
probe items may be ideal for an effective CKT (e.g.,
Lykken 1998), in forensic investigations key case details
can often be leaked or otherwise compromised (Podlesny
2003). In such cases it may be tempting to consider CKT
probe items based on peripheral crimescene information.
Unfortunately, the accuracy of the CKT using peripheral
information, especially after long delays, is unclear. Rela-
ted issues have been explored in studies on eyewitness
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123memory and typically show that central crime details are
better remembered than peripheral ones when tested after a
delay. Central details have also proven more resistant to
alteration by later misleading information (e.g., Christianson
and Loftus 1991; Loftus 1979). Although, it seems advis-
able to limit CKT probes to the most central crime details,
it is still possible that peripheral items will be sufﬁciently
recollected for detection. Clearly, a concealed knowledge
effect cannot be observed for information absent from
memory (Carmel et al. 2003), but poorly elaborated
memories may still be detected by the CKT.
Because later memory for crime items may be inﬂu-
enced by an interaction between encoding effects at the
crimescene and the time between crime and test, it may be
difﬁcult to determine the appropriateness of a particular
probe set by considering either quality of encoding or test
delay alone. However, to our knowledge, no previous study
has simultaneously examined the inﬂuence of these vari-
ables on CKT efﬁciency. In the present study we examined
this interaction using a variation of the CKT procedure
that uses response times (RT) and accuracy as measures
(Seymour and Kerlin 2008; Seymour et al. 2000). Although
Seymour and colleagues have shown that an RT-based
paradigm can accurately detect concealed knowledge with
immediate tests, this paradigm has yet to be evaluated in
delayed tests. Beneﬁts of this paradigm include its ease and
low cost of measurement compared to some psychphysio-
logical measures, as well as a more straightforward anal-
ysis procedure.
Methods
We used an RT-based CKT under two conditions: (a) probe
items were elaborated during study using multiple stimulus
and response modalities; (b) probe items were minimally
elaborated during study. In addition, we varied the time
delay between probe study and the later test.
Participants
Participants were 109 undergraduate students (60 female)
recruited by ﬂyer from the University of California Santa
Cruz community. Participants were promised $15 for their
participation, and were later offered an additional $10
incentive to ‘‘beat the test.’’
Materials
Stimuli consisted of 72 two-word phrases previously used
in this and similar paradigms (Farwell and Donchin 1991;
Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Seymour and Kerlin 2008; Seymour
et al. 2000). For each participant, phrases were randomly
arranged into two sets of 36 phrases that contained six sub-
groups; names (e.g., ‘‘Phil Jenks’’), street names (e.g.,
‘‘Perch Street’’), ﬁle descriptions (e.g., ‘‘Rain File’’), arti-
cles of clothing (e.g., ‘‘Blue Coat’’), and operation names
(e.g., ‘‘Op Horse’’). Within each stimulus set, six items
(one from each category) were randomly designated as
probe items, six items (one from each category) were
randomly designated as target items, and 24 (four from
each category) were randomly designated as irrelevant
items.
Procedure
The procedure (depicted in Fig. 1) replicated previously
reported RT-CKT paradigms and consisted of a probe
study task, a delay period, and two concealed knowledge
tests. Each test consisted of a target study task, and a phrase
classiﬁcation task. Participants were randomly assigned to
either a shallow or deep probe-study condition, and to one
of three delay conditions: 10 min, 24 h, or 1 week.
Probe Study Tasks
Participants in both study conditions ﬁrst completed a
cued-recall task in which they were asked to memorize the
probe phrases. This task involved studying the six probes in
a randomly ordered list (e.g., ‘‘First Phrase: Blue Coat’’)
and attempting to commit them to memory. Participants
were subsequently instructed to recall the list in order in
response to positional cues (e.g., ‘‘First Phrase:’’) and were
given accuracy feedback on their performance. This cued-
recall task (study and test) was repeated three times.
Following cued-recall, the procedure diverges for par-
ticipants in the shallow and deep conditions: those in the
shallow condition completed a single news paraphrase task,
whereas those in the deep study condition completed a
series of probe association tasks.
The news paraphrase task required participants to read a
mock newspaper story (140 words) that included the six
probe phrases in the description of a ﬁctitious campus theft
and were then asked to paraphrase it in writing. Partici-
pants were informed that they would need to paraphrase the
story and thus spent 3 min on average studying the text.
Instead of the newspaper task, participants in the deep
condition completed a set of four new tasks (picture
matching, word jumble, hand writing, and word shouting)
designed to increase exposure duration, require increased
attention, and lead to rich and multimodal memory repre-
sentations (c.f., Waid et al. 1981b). Each of the four tasks
involved random presentation of all six probes in three
separate blocks for a total of 12 task blocks. These task
blocks were randomly mixed together so that no two suc-
cessive blocks involved the same task (e.g., pm, wj, ws,
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pants were given accuracy feedback, except for the shout
task during which response time feedback was displayed
instead. Overall, this task is similar to the overlearning
technique previously reported by Waid and colleagues,
who also asked participants to write each word backwards,
provide the list in alphabetical order, and to provide free
associates of each word.
During the word jumble task each probe phrase was
presented with its letters strategically rearranged to obscure
the source phrase (e.g., ‘‘Lion Street’’ became ‘‘ettlesin-
or’’). Participants were asked to type the phrase indicated
by the jumbled string. For each block of the jumble task we
presented a different jumble of each phrase with each letter
arranged for maximum incongruity.
The picture matching task involved presentation of an
image that referred to one of the probe phrases (e.g., a
picture of a blue coat for ‘‘blue coat’’). Participants were
asked to verbally identify which phrase corresponded to the
picture. Each block of the picture matching task used a
different type of image; full color photorealistic images,
sparsely colored line drawings, and grayscale illustrations
(See Fig. 2).
On each trial of the word shouting task a probe phrase
was presented and participants were asked to shout each
phrase three times quickly. Emphasis was placed on
responding quickly while still fully enunciating each word.
Unlike the other probe association tasks, all three blocks of
the word shouting task involved the same stimuli and
responses.
Finally, during the handwriting task we presented each
probe phrase and asked participants to write this phrase on
paper. Each written response was to completely ﬁll a 6-
inch by 2-inch box pre-drawn on the paper. This constraint
increased participants’ engagement with each response and
ensured legibility. Each handwriting block presented the
same stimuli, but required a different type of writing;
cursive, lowercase print, or uppercase print.
Test Delay
Following the set of probe study tasks, participants in the
10-min delay condition completed a distractor task
designed to occupy working memory and prevent rehearsal
of the probe items. The task consisted of 11 challenging
mathematical word problems taken from Patalano and
Seifert (1994). Participants in the 24 h and 1-week delay
conditions were instead told that the session was over and
asked to return to the lab after exactly 24 h or 7 days,
respectively.
Target Study
After the delay, participants learned a new set of six target
phrases by using the cued-recall procedure described above
for the probe-study task. However, none of the additional
study tasks used during probe study (i.e., neither newspaper
nor overlearning tasks) were used during target study.
Thus, regardless of whether participants were in the shal-
low or deep probe-study condition, target study always
Fig. 1 Overview of
experimental design
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that target items were always less elaborated than probes
and this arrangement mimics the relationship between
targets and probes one might expect in forensic use of this
paradigm. To the knowledgeable participant in such con-
texts, probe items should be more elaborated and consoli-
dated in memory compared to target items learned just
prior to test (Elaad 1997). This would be true even if the
examiner took care to match probe and target items on
appearance and conceptual makeup (e.g., ‘‘White Shirt’’
and ‘‘Brown Pants’’).
Classiﬁcation Task
After the target-study task, participants performed a series
forced-choice binary classiﬁcations consisting of 6 targets,
6 probes, and 24 new irrelevant phrases in randomized
order. Participants were asked to indicate their familiarity
Fig. 2 Examples of how
images differed for each picture
matching task block in the Deep
Study condition (note: colorful
images are shown here in
grayscale). Presentation of each
probe concept (e.g., ‘‘snow ﬁle’’
or ‘‘sub plans’’) was depicted
using a full color photograph
(top row), a sparse color sketch
(middle panel), and a grayscale
illustration (bottom panel)
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123with each item by pressing buttons labeled ‘‘Yes’’ and
‘‘No’’ for familiar and unfamiliar stimuli, respectively.
They were asked to respond truthfully to familiar target
items (‘‘Yes’’) and new irrelevant phrases (‘‘No’’), but they
were asked to respond deceptively to familiar probes items
(‘‘No’’). Before each stimulus was displayed, the word
‘‘Ready’’ was displayed for 500 ms, followed by a ﬁxation
cross for 500 ms. The stimulus remained on the screen
until a response was made, and both speed and accuracy
were equally stressed. If responses were slower than
1,500 ms, the message ‘‘Too Slow’’ was displayed for 1 s
before the next stimulus was displayed; otherwise, no
feedback was given within blocks. The same test list was
re-randomized and repeated three times for a total of 108
trials. After each test block (i.e., a sequence of 36 trials),
participants were given feedback on accuracy as well as the
number of ‘‘Too Slow’’ errors. On each trial, RT and
accuracy were recorded using ‘‘E-Prime’’ stimulus pre-
sentation software (Schneider et al. 2002).
The combination of the target-study and phrase-classi-
ﬁcation task was completed twice for each participant in
two separate tests, neither of which shared any of the same
phrases. During the unfamiliar-probe test, probe phrases
were novel and participants had no means of distinguishing
probe and irrelevant items. Data from this test is equivalent
to testing a participant who has no knowledge of crime
details and served as a basis to estimate the test’s false
positive rate, which is typically between 0 and 3% (e.g.,
Seymour and Kerlin 2008; Seymour et al. 2000). Alterna-
tively, probes in the familiar-probe test were taken from
the earlier probe-study task and expected to result in slower
and less accurate responses on probe than irrelevant trials.
Prior to completing these tests, we informed participants
that the procedure was a new type of ‘‘lie-detector test’’
designed to measure their familiarity with probe items they
previously learned. They were encouraged to try and con-
ceal their knowledge of any familiar-probe phrases they
encounter by responding just as quickly and accurately to
probes as irrelevants. Although recruited with the under-
standing that they would receive $15 for the study, partic-
ipants were now shown and offered an additional $10 bill
for successfully concealing their knowledge of probe
phrases. This bonus was contingent on achieving a typical
unfamiliar-probe pattern of results: at least 85% accuracy
on all trial types (target, probe, and irrelevant), and statis-
tically identical probe and irrelevant RT distributions
(assessed with a t-test). The 85% accuracy constraint rules
out the strategy of ignoring the target stimuli and quickly
pressing ‘‘No’’ on each trial. This is indeed the beneﬁt of
having target trials and distinguishes the present CKT par-
adigm from some others that only include probes and
irrelevant items (for a review of several CKT variations, see
Ben-Shakhar and Elaad 2003). Test order (familiar-probe
vs. unfamiliar-probe) was counterbalanced and, participants
learned a different set of target phrases for each test.
Results and Discussion
Three participants were not able to achieve at least 67%
correct on the target or probe-study tasks even after three
study iterations. Because we could not establish that these
participants had memorized the test items, they were




each participant by subtracting mean irrelevant RT from
mean probe RT (both ‘‘No’’ responses). The mean effect on
RT in this test is shown in Fig. 3 (top graph) as a function of
test delay and probe study condition, and was entered into a
2 (condition: deep, shallow) 9 3 (delay: 10 min, 1 day,
1 week) ANOVA. Overall, the RT effect in the deep con-
dition (M = 115.55; SD = 49.17) was greater than in the
shallow condition (M = 87.87; SD = 39.25), F(1,
100) = 10.23, p\0.01, gp
2 = 0.09. A main effect of delay
was also revealed, F(2, 100) = 4.62, p\0.02, gp
2 = 0.08,
presumably driven by the decreasing effect in the shallow
condition over time. Though the magnitude of the RT effect
for deep study, but not the shallow-study condition,
remained constant over time, the condition 9 delay inter-
action was not statistically signiﬁcant, F(2, 100) = 1.79,
p = 0.17, gp
2 = 0.03. This lack of interaction was presum-
ably inﬂuenced by the 24-h delay in the shallow condition.
Although the concealed knowledge effect differed
between the 10 min and 24 h delays, t(29) = 2.93,
p\0.01, and the 10 min and 1 week delays, t(37) = 4.44,
p\0.001, the 24 h vs. 1 week delay difference was not,
t(34)\1. Thus, we performed an additional 2 condi-
tion 9 2 delay ANOVA (omitting the 24 h delay group).
This analysis resulted in main effects of Condition, F(1,
73) = 9.91, p\0.01, gp
2 = 0.08, and Delay, F(2,
73) = 6.22, p\0.02, gp
2 = 12, similar to the previous
analysis. However, the interaction was now marginally
signiﬁcant, F(2, 73) = 3.78, p = 0.06, gp
2 = 0.05.
Accuracy
The effect on accuracy was calculated by subtracting probe
from irrelevant accuracy for each participant (see Table 1).
An ANOVA was performed on these data similar to the RT
analysis but revealed no main effects or interactions. In
general, accuracy was near ceiling regardless of the quality
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123of study or delay between study and test. Although this
would be problematic in a standard recognition study
where accuracy may serve as an indication of how appro-
priate a task is for testing participants’ memory, here the
result serves as a manipulation check on the ﬁnancial
incentive offered to participants. It also suggested that
knowledge detection accuracy would be driven primarily
by the RT measure.
Classiﬁcation Analysis
An individual participant classiﬁcation was used to dif-
ferentiate participants’ familiar-probe test from their
unfamiliar-probe test. Because each participant completed
familiar and unfamiliar-probe tests, a hit rate and false
positive rate could be calculated for each participant. A
three-part algorithm compared probe and irrelevant
distributions on shape (Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test), variance
(F-test for variances), and number of errors (Fisher’s exact
test). If either one of these tests was statistically signiﬁcant
compared to a Bonferonni corrected alpha level (i.e., 0.05
divided by 3 tests = 0.016), the probe and irrelevant dis-
tributions were assumed to be distinct, and thus the par-
ticipant was deemed ‘‘familiar’’ with probe items during
that test. If none of these statistical tests reached signiﬁ-
cance, it was concluded that the data were from a familiar-
probe test (a hit for familiar-probe data, a false alarm for
unfamiliar-probe data). Otherwise, it was assumed that the
responses were from the unfamiliar-probe test (a miss for
familiar-probe data, and a correct rejection for unfamiliar-
probe data). This analysis has been used on similar data in
previous studies and has yielded high hit rates and low
false alarm rates (Seymour and Kerlin 2008; Seymour et al.
2000).
Figure 3(bottom graph)showsclassiﬁcation accuracyby
ConditionandDelay inthefamiliar-probe test(i.e.,meanhit
rate). The resulting detection accuracy was analyzed using a
2 (study type) 9 3 (delay) ANOVA. Although there was no
main effect of delay, F(2, 100) = 1.06, p = 0.35, gp
2 =
0.02, the decreasing detection accuracy for the shallow
condition was sufﬁcient to yield a main effect of condition,
F(1, 100) = 9.23, p\0.01, gp
2 = 0.08. Furthermore, the
disparate detection patterns over time as a function of study
type was supported by a signiﬁcant interaction, F(2, 100) =
3.63, p\0.05, gp
2 = 0.07. This analysis was conducted on
distributions of binary values (either a one or zero for each
participant in each cell representing correct or incorrect
classiﬁcation) which typically violate the normality
assumption of ANOVA. Thus, we also conducted a contrast
analysis on the number of correct detections per cell. With
this analysis, we are able to test the speciﬁc interaction
evident in Fig. 3 (bottom graph); that deep study leads to a
stable number of correct classiﬁcations over time, whereas
shallow study leads to decreasing number of correct clas-
siﬁcations (for a review of contrast analysis on frequency
data, see Furr and Rosenthal 2003). A contrast analysis on
this pattern was signiﬁcant, F(1, 100) = 18.20, p\0.001,
Fig. 3 Top graph: Mean concealed knowledge effect on RT in
milliseconds (probe-irrelevant) for the familiar-probe test. Positive
values indicate probe RTs were slower than irrelevant RTs. Data are
shown as a function of study-test delay and probe study condition.
Error bars represent ±1 SEM. Bottom graph: Proportion of correct
classiﬁcations in the familiar-probe test (i.e., hit rate). Classiﬁcations
are shown as a function of study-test delay and probe study condition.
Note: three false positives (3.3% of participants) are not represented
Table 1 Mean concealed knowledge effect on accuracy in percent
correct (irrelevant-probe) for the familiar-probe test
Probe Study Delay
10 min 24 h 1 week
Deep 3.3% (1.0%) 7.9% (1.2%) 3.3% (0.8%)
Shallow 4.3% (2.0%) 3.8% (1.0%) 3.2% (1.3%)
Positive values indicate that probe responses were less accurate than
irrelevant responses. Data are shown as a function of delay and probe
study condition
Values in parentheses are 1 ± SEM
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2 = 0.15, whereas a test of the prediction that study type
and delay do not interact was not conﬁrmed, F(1,
100) = 1.52, p = 0.22, gp
2 = 0.01.
Unfamiliar-Probe Test
Mean concealed knowledge effect on RT (probe-irrelevant)
and accuracy (irrelevant-probe) in the unfamiliar-probe test
is shown in Table 2 as a function of delay and condition. A
2 (condition) 9 3 (delay) ANOVA was performed on the
RT data, revealing no main effects or interactions. This is
the expected pattern during the unfamiliar-probe test
because participants are unable to distinguish between
probe and irrelevant stimuli. A similar analysis was per-
formed on the accuracy data from the unfamiliar-probe test
(see Table 2). Though the accuracy effect in this test
ranged from 0% (24 h and 1 week) to only 1.3% (10 min),
a statistically signiﬁcant main effect of delay was revealed,
F(2, 100) = 4.91, p\0.01, gp
2 = 0.09. Although it
appears that the accuracy effect at the 24-h time delay was
5% greater for deep than shallow conditions, a Bonferroni
corrected post-hoc t-test revealed no signiﬁcant differences
between cells. No other main effects or interactions were
found for the effect on accuracy. The detection algorithm
described above for the familiar-probe test was used to
calculate the false positive rate during the unfamiliar-probe
test. Because the probes in this test were unfamiliar, the test
should have ideally determined all participants to be
‘‘unfamiliar.’’ The test yielded an overall correct rejection
rate of 96.7%, producing a false positive for three partici-
pants (two in the 10-min deep condition, and one in the
1-week shallow study condition). Thus, due to an insufﬁ-
cient number of false positives, the effect of study type and
delay could not be analyzed for the unfamiliar-probe test.
Typically in this paradigm, familiar-probe responses are
both slower and less accurate than on irrelevant trials
(Seymour and Kerlin 2008; Seymour et al. 2000). How-
ever, in the present study, probe and irrelevant accuracies
were near ceiling for both tests leading to an attenuated
accuracy effect. Based on debrieﬁng of participants, the
$10 reward for ‘‘beating the test’’ was highly motivating
and led to cautious responding on probe and target trials.
Although participants were able equate probe and irrele-
vant accuracy rates, they were unable to speed up probe
responses sufﬁciently to attenuate the RT effect. Thus we
were able to detect participants’ knowledge of the probes
phrases, despite their attempts to conceal it. The strong test
efﬁciency in light of the attenuated accuracy effect is
promising because the $10 reward for ‘‘beating the test’’ in
the current procedure represents a stronger incentive than
in previous RT-based CKT studies (Rosenfeld et al. 2004;
Seymour and Kerlin 2008; Seymour et al. 2000).
The classiﬁcation results were striking. For immediate
tests, probe elaboration did not inﬂuence the test and an
overall classiﬁcation accuracy (familiar-probes and unfa-
miliar-probes) of 93% was observed. However, after
1 week, overall classiﬁcation for well-elaborated probes
remained high at 90%, whereas classiﬁcation using poorly
elaborated probes approached chance.
General Discussion
The present study is the ﬁrst to explicitly examine or
demonstrate an interaction of time delay and encoding
depth on the efﬁciency of the RT-based CKT. Previous
studies have only examined time delay or encoding depth.
The results show that for well-learned information, detec-
tion accuracy was high and relatively stable over the
examined time period. Less elaborated items were accu-
rately detected after 10 min, but by 1 week test accuracy
was signiﬁcantly compromised. In previous CKT studies,
test accuracy was affected by test delay in some cases
(Rosenfeld et al. 1991; Waid et al. 1978, 1981a), but not in
others (Carmel et al. 2003). The present data suggest that
this discrepancy may have been driven by differences in
probe elaboration.
Differentiating Centrality and Encoding Level
The present results clearly suggest that for delayed tests,
elaborated items make better probes than unelaborated
ones. However, examiners creating CKT test-lists can only
reasonably determine which items were central to the
crime. Unfortunately, centrality does not guarantee rich
encoding. For example, while the most highly emotional
and salient aspects of a crime scene (e.g., a weapon) seem
Table 2 Mean concealed knowledge effect on RT in milliseconds
(probe-irrelevant) and accuracy in percent correct (irrelevant-probe)
for the unfamiliar-probe test
Condition Delay
10 min 24 h 1 week
RT
Deep 11.17 (12.91) -13.08 (5.23) 8.43 (7.15)
Shallow -10.59 (8.10) 1.96 (9.37) 0.94 (12.13)
Accuracy
Deep 0.86% (1.0%) -0.19% (1.0%) 0.34% (0.50%)
Shallow 1.76% (1.5%) -0.60% (1.0%) -0.65% (1.0%)
Positive values indicate that probe responses were slower or less
accurate than irrelevant responses. Data are shown as a function of
study-test delay and probe study condition
Values in parentheses are 1 ± SEM
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salient items, this heightened attentional focus to some
items can decrease the likelihood that other items are well
encoded (including other central items). This weapon-focus
effect has been demonstrated in the literature (e.g., Loftus
et al. 1987) and may ensure that some central crime-scene
items can serve as effective probes while other may not.
Similarly, there may also be peripheral details that are
sufﬁciently encoded to later serve as effective probes.
Baddeley (1978) pointed out that there are many conditions
in which initially shallow encoding can lead to a durable
memory trace. For example, peripheral information may
resist forgetting when it is unusual or particularly vivid,
contain associated olfactory information, or has associated
physical action (Baddeley 1999). Numerous studies have
also found that emotionally valenced information is
remembered better after a delay than neutral items. This is
true for both recall (e.g., Christianson and Loftus 1991),
and recognition (e.g., Comblain et al. 2004; Johanssonet al.
2004).
Furthermore, these studies typically show that nega-
tively valenced stimuli lead to more durable memory traces
than positive or neutral items. However, in some cases,
positively charged items are remembered better (Matt et al.
1992), and can interact with age (Mather and Carstensen
2003). There is also evidence that arousal, and not emo-
tional valence itself, leads to increased retention of emo-
tional items (Bradleyet al. 1992; Kensinger and Corkin
2003; Kleinsmith and Kaplan 1963). This link with general
arousal may offer a mechanism whereby peripheral items
are encoded well enough to support later recognition.
Future Directions
One question unanswered by these data is the potential
effect of explicit countermeasure instructions on both the
immediate and delayed RT-based CKT. Successful counter-
measures have been reported that signiﬁcantly reduce
the efﬁciency of most notable CKT variations (e.g., Ben-
Shakhar and Dolev 1996; Elaad 1999; Hontse et al. 1996;
Rosenfeld et al. 2004). Although we did not offer partici-
pants an explicit countermeasure strategy, the present study
does offer some insight. Participants were informed about
how the concealed knowledge effect was scored (compar-
ison of the speed and accuracy differences between probe
and irrelevant responses) and offered a 10$ ﬁnancial
incentive to equate these responses. The resulting attenua-
tion of the accuracy effect compared to previous RT-based
CKT reports suggests that participants were indeed trying to
beat the test. However, the classiﬁcation accuracy found for
elaborated probes was similar to Seymour et al. (2000) who
gave participants a speciﬁc countermeasure strategy, but
offered a weaker incentive.
Some researchers has also suggested that due to factors
such as level of motivation, laboratory tests may overes-
timate the size of the concealed knowledge effect exam-
iners can expect in the ﬁeld (Ben-Shakhar and Elaad 2003;
Ben-Shakhar and Furedy 1990; Carmel et al. 2003; Elaad
1990; Gronauet al. 2005). Typically these studies report
larger effect sizes in laboratory settings than in the ﬁeld,
although examining whether this difference affects detec-
tion efﬁciency is not as common. A study by Pollina et al.
(2004) showed that despite differences in effect sizes,
classiﬁcation accuracy was the same in the laboratory and
in the ﬁeld. Similarly, a large meta-analysis of CKT studies
revealed a signiﬁcant difference in test effect-size when
‘‘highly motivated’’ participants (d = 1.76) were compared
to those with ‘‘low motivation’’ (d = 1.34), but not on their
respective test efﬁciencies (a = 0.82 and 0.80, respec-
tively; Ben-Shakhar and Elaad 2003).
Concern for the applied forensic use of the CKT has also
been expressed by researchers who examine real crime
caseﬁles (Elaad 1990; Elaad et al. 1992; Podlesny 2003).
For example, Podlesny examined 758 FBI case ﬁles and
found only 15% with critical details sufﬁciently speciﬁc to
the case to serve as ‘‘good’’ probes, and only 11% with
details known solely to the FBI. The implication of this
ﬁnding depends on how one intends to use the CKT. If the
goal is to identify guilty suspects, then speciﬁc probes
shielded from leakage are needed. Podlesny’s report shows
that in many FBI investigations this requirement is not met.
However, if the goal is to identify suspects or witnesses, or
to eliminate suspects from further consideration (i.e., focus
on ﬁnding those who have relevant knowledge), then the
CKT is an accurate and reliable tool. We note that even one
or two ‘‘good’’ probes may be sufﬁcient. Although six or
more items are often considered ideal, number of probes
does not appear to be highly correlated with CKT effect
size or test efﬁciency (Ben-Shakhar and Elaad 2003).
Finally, although the present interaction between delay
and encoding can be logically extrapolated to delays longer
than the 1-week period we examined, more research is
needed to test longer delays and also to compare multiple
CKT variations under such conditions. We also expect the
relationship between time and encoding shown here to
apply to other CKTs measures.
Conclusion
We’ve provided the ﬁrst clear demonstration of how probe
elaboration and test delay interact in their inﬂuence on CKT
accuracy. The present results support test administrators’
typical bias towards using more central crime details in
applied detection tasks, but they also suggest that for
immediate tests, peripheral probes may be just as effective.
When these data are considered in light of memory research
Appl Psychophysiol Biofeedback (2009) 34:177–187 185
123that suggests central crime-details can remain unelaborated
and peripheral details can be richly encoded, the interpre-
tation of negative test results is no longer straightforward.
More research is needed on the interaction between delay
and encoding that includes explicit countermeasures and
longer delays.
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